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et al.: Civil Procedure: Seider with a Minnesota Flavor—A Federal Court I

CIVIL PROCEDURE: SEIDER WITH A MINNESOTA
FLAVOR-A FEDERAL COURT IMPORTS QUASI IN REM
JURISDICTION BASED ON GARNISHMENT OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE OBLIGATIONS
[Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Min.i. 1973)].
I. INTRODUCTION

The effect of insurance upon the rules of legal liability, although still
largely covert,' intrudes with ever-increasing force upon the consciousness of
the legal community. Whether the spiraling growth of the insurance industry
is a cause or consequence of today's bias toward protecting the individual
against the financial burden of modern society's inevitable casualties' is a
question of little more than academic interest. Regardless of the origin of the
phenomenon, a blurring of the identities of the defendant and his insurer has
spread far beyond the law of torts3 to invade other areas of the substantive
law as well.'
The trend is exemplified by an increasing impatience with procedural
rules which bar the injured plaintiff's access to the insurance pool.' Once
I. A few years before his death, Dean Prosser noted with surprise that the widespread use of
liability insurance had had but a limited overt effect upon the law of torts. W. PROSSER, TillE
LAW OF TORTS § 83 (4th ed. 1971).
2. See R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE 126-29 (1969).

3. The effect of insurance upon the law of torts may be most obvious in the movement toward
no-fault insurance. Clearly, the current emphasis is upon the insurance rather than the tort-law
aspects of the automobile accident reparation system. See, e.g., W. Bi UM & H. KAi.VEN, PUBICi(
LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM 21-24 (1965).

Indeed, the prevalence of

liability insurance and the common view that its purpose is to compensate persons injured in
automobile accidents form much of the impetus for the reform movement. See W. PROSSIEiR,
supra note 1, at §83:
Dedicated advocates of sweeping change, in which liability insurance is to play a predominant part, have sought to buttress their arguments by the contention that such
insurance already has revolutionized the law of torts; that it has rendered obsolete the
rules of negligence which have become a mere set of formulae to which the courts still
afford lip service while in fact looking to the insurance; that the change is half made and
therefore should be completed.
See R. KFETON, supra note 2, at 126-29.
4. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, frankly places the risk of casualty loss to
goods in certain circumstances upon the party who has procured insurance coverage. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAl CODE § 2-510.
5. A good example is the widespread adoption of statutes which in effect convert automobile
indemnity insurance into automobile liability insurance. Automobile liability insurance was

originally a contract whereby the insurer agreed to indemnify its insured for losses sustained by
him by reason of his tort liability to others. Thus, the insured could not require the insurer to pay
the tort judgment obtained by victim, rather, he could only require the insurer to indemnify him
after he had paid the judgnent himself. Where its insured was insolvent, the insurer avoided
liability altogether. For detailed discussion of this doctrine, see G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF
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tolerantly viewed as a useful legal fiction,' the rule that only the tortfeasor
and not his liability insurer, is-the real party defendant7 to a personal injury
action,' has recently fallen into disfavor. Many now recognize openly the role
of the insurer in the trial of the lawsuit,9 and although their view has not been
fully accepted, the separation between the insurer and its insured is commonly disregarded in order to prevent prejudice to the plaintiff. 0
Where the real-party-defendant rule effectively denies the plaintiff a
forum, as it sometimes may in actions with multi-state contacts, the temptation to discard the fiction occasionally becomes overwhelming. Certainly,
the equitable position of the plaintiff is persuasive when he must incur the
often prohibitive expense of pursuing the defendant to a far-away forum to
obtain personal jurisdicition, while defendant's insurer, regularly transacting its business in plaintiffs home state, remains impervious to suit."
"Direct action," a doctrine permitting the plaintiff to name the insurer
INSURANCE LAW

§

45:16 to :26 (2d ed. 1964): R.

KEETON,

BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW

§ 4.8(b) (1971). A number of states have adopted statutes requiring policy provisions that the
insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured does not relieve the insurer of liability. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. § 170.40, subd. 6(2) (1971). See also G. COUCH, supra, at § 45:26. In other jurisdictions,
insurers, fearing legislative action, have included insolvency clauses in their standard policy
forms. R. KEETON, supra at § 4.8(b).
6. Apparently, the original purpose of limiting the victim's right to proceed against the
insurer prior to obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor was to avoid inflated verdicts which
it was feared might result if the jury learned that the tortfeasor was insured and would not be
required to pay the judgment himself. See R. KEETON, supra note 5, at § 7.11 : Rudser, Direct
Actions Against Insurance Companies, 45 N.D.L. REv. 483, 484 (1969). Modern empirical studies
have cast doubt upon the validity of this theory, however. Cf Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 754 (1959).
7. This phrase is coined as a rough equivalent to "real party in interest." Use of the latter
term, though more familiar, is confusing in light of the fact that the rules of civil procedure limit
its applicability to plaintiffs. MINN. R. Civ. P. 17.01.
8. In states which have adopted rules based upon the federal rules, which have relaxed requirements for joinder, the victim's inability to join the liability insurer is not so much the result of any
rule of law or procedure as of the fact that insurers universally include "no-action" clauses in
their liability policies. See Rudser, supra note 6, at 483, 484; Note, The Liability Insurer as a
Real Party in Interest.- Proposed Amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, 41
MINN. L. REv. 784, 786-88 (1959). These clauses typically provide that no action shall lie against
the insurer until the insured's liability has been adjudicated in an independent action or until the
claimant, insured, and insurer have entered into a settlement agreement. For an example of a
standard no-action clause, see R. KEETON, supra note 5, at app. H.
9. See generally authorities collected note 84 infra.
10. Minnesota, for example, now permits the plaintiff to discover the limits of defendant's
insurance coverage. MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02. In effect, a 1968 amendment expressly permitting
such discovery overruled earlier case law. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02, Advisory Committee
Note. The Minnesota Supreme Court had interpreted the rules as previously constituted as not
permitting discovery of this type since the information thus obtained could have no bearing on
the merits of the action, but could only be relevant to the plaintiff's strategic decision of whether
to settle the action. Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
I1. See Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. II, 24, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390, 399 (Super. Ct.,
App. Dep't 1973): McHugh v. Paley, 63 Misc. 2d 1092, 1096-97, 314 N.Y.S.2d 208, 213-14
(Sup. Ct. 1970).
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as a defendant in the tort action, is one means which might be adapted to
permit the plaintiff to sue at home. It has, however, found acceptance in only
a few jurisdictions and then generally in a form unsuited to provide the
resident plaintiff with a local forum when the injury occurs in another state.' 2
Most courts which have desired to reach that result have instead seized
upon newly-liberalized theories of jurisdiction to permit the plaintiff to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction"1 over the defendant in the plaintiff's home state
if the defendant's insurer does business there. The insurer's obligations to
12. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3244 (1966) (the power to sue the automobile liability insurer is
limited to claims for personal injury or property damage arising outside of the United States)
GA. CODE ANN. § 68-612 (1967) (applies only where a regulated motor carrier has given a policy
of indemnity insurance in lieu of required bond); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (Supp. 1974)
(applies to all liability insurance provided the accident or injury occurred within Louisiana):
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-7-2 (Supp. 1973) (applies only when plaintiff cannot obtain personal
jurisdiction over the insured or when a non-resident involved in an automobile accident in Rhode
Island dies before suit has been brought); WIs. STAT. § 260.11 (1973) (applies only to injuries or
negligence occuring in the state of Wisconsin if the insurance policy was issued or delivered outside of Wisconsin). Puerto Rico has adopted a similar statute. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, §§2001,
2003 (1958). Florida has adopted direct action by judicial decision. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223
So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
13. In a quasi in rem proceeding, the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal claim against the
defendant by applying the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of his claim through
attachment or garnishment. Attachment and garnishment are statutory remedies for the collection of a debt. Property held by the debtor himself, in the case of attachment, or property
belonging to the debtor and held by a third party in the case of garnishment, is seized as security
for a potential judgment prior to any adjudication of the personal rights and obligations of the
plaintiff and defendant. Both require that an attachable res exist, although it may
consist of either intangible or tangible property.
Assuming that the defendant is a non-resident and that he is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court, the garnishee and the res ordinarily must both be within the court's jurisdiction. If the property is within the court's jurisdiction and the garnishee is not, the property may
remain garnishable, but if the garnishee is subject to the court's jurisdiction while the property is
outside of the state, the action will probably be dismissed. If neither the garnishee nor the property is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the action cannot be maintained. See Beale, The
Exercise ofJurisdiction In Rem To Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV. L. REV. 1017 (1913).
The basic elements of quasi in rem jurisdiction are the presence of the res within the state, the
seizure of the res at the commencement of the proceedings, and an opportunity for the owner of
the res to be heard. Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917): Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Though nominally in rem, quasi in rem is, in reality, a form of limited personal jurisdiction
which allows the determination of the personal rights and obligations of the parties, with the
plaintiff's recovery being satisfied out of the property which furnished the basis of the jurisdiction. It developed largely to ameliorate the harsh effects upon injured plaintiffs of the restricted
territorial limitations on personal jurisdiction adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Pennoyer v. Neff, which permitted a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant only
if process were served personally on a defendant while he was within the forum or by means of
substituted service on a resident defendant. The modern expansion of the courts' power to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants has led the commentators to debate
whether quasi in rem jurisdiction remains necessary or desirable. See Carrington, The Modern
Utility of Quasi In Rein Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L. REV. 303 (1962); Currie, A ttachment and
Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 Mici. L. REV. 337 (1961).
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the defendant are viewed as a res, with its situs in the state where plaintiff
resides, to which quasi in rem jurisdiction may attach." Both techniques
are of recent origin and limited acceptance and produce unsettled results. 5
In Rintala v. Shoemaker," the Minnesota federal district court chose quasi
in rem jurisdiction to require a non-resident defendant and his resident insurer to defend to the limits of the liability insurance policy plaintiff's wrongful death action, thereby moving Minnesota into the forefront of the controversy surrounding the use of this procedural device to subvert the realparty-defendant fiction. In Rintala, the plaintiff, a Minnesota resident, 7
brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota,S for wrongful death arising out of a Florida automobile accident,
claiming that defendant, a Michigan resident, negligently caused the death
of her husband, a passenger in defendant's vehicle. The plaintiff commenced
the action by filing a complaint and having a garnishee summons served on
the defendant's insurance company, which was admitted to do business in
Minnesota.' Copies of the garnishee summons, along with the summons and
complaint, were served on defendant in Michigan.20 Defendant's insurer
responded to disclosure interrogatories 2 with a motion to dismiss the garnishee summons, alleging lack of jurisdiction and failure to attach a garnishable res, and to dismiss the main action for lack of jurisdiction, improper
venue, and the taking of property without due process of law. 22
The court found that it had no personal jurisdiction over the defendant
since he was not subject to Minnesota's "long arm" jurisdiction, 23 but held
that quasi in rem jurisdiction had been validly obtained. 21 It reasoned that
the duties owed by the defendant's insurance company to the defendant25 con14. See Seider v. Roth, 17 NY.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The technique was initiated in this decision.
15. See generally Stein, Jurisdictionby A ttachnientof Liability Insurance,43 N.Y.U. L. R r'v.
1075 (1968): Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operationaland Conflict-of-Law Problems.
74 HARV. L. REv. 357 (1960).
16. 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973).
17. She was appointed trustee for the purposes of the wrongful death action pursuant to
MINN. STAT. § 573.02(3) (197 1).
I8. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
19. The garnishee summons was actually served upon Minnesota's Commissioner of Insurance. who, for purposes of service of process, was appointed the insurer's agent. MINN. STAT,
§ 60A.19(3) (197 1).
20. FmI). R. Ctv. P. 4(e) provides that when a non-resident defendant is served notice to
defend in an action by reason of the garnishment of his property, service may be made in accordance with the statute or rule of court of the state in which the federal court is located. Thus,
plaintiff sought to obtain jurisdiction by complying with MINN. STAT. ch. 571 (1971) and MINN.
R. Ctv. P. 4.04.
21. Served pursuant to MINN. STA. § 571.49(l) (1971).
22. 362 F. Supp. at 1046-47.
23. MINN.STAT. §543.19 (1971).
24. 362 F. Supp. at 1053.
25. The court was apparently referring to the insurance company's contract obligations to
defend and indemnify the defendant. See id. at 1047.
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stituted a res which, by statute and because of the state's interest in protecting
its residents, had a Minnesota situs and was properly garnishable there.2"
Thus, upon garnishment of the res and proper notice to the defendant,
plaintiff obtained valid quasi in rem jurisdiction. The court did state, however, that in order to satisfy the requirements of due process, defendant's
liability would be limited to the amount of his insurance coverage.27
The rationale underlying the court's acceptance of garnishment of the insurer's obligation as a basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction was two-fold. First,
the court found Minnesota's statutory scheme of pre-judgment garnishment
sufficiently broad to encompass the obligations an automobile liability
insurer owes its insured.2" Second, the court believed that the procedure
satisfied the requirement of "overall fairness" to the parties required by due
process. 21 The court buttressed its second holding with the decisions of the
New York Court of Appeals, and, more persuasively, with the decisions of
other federal courts which have considered the application of due process
requirements to this type of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 0 For its first holding,
however, the court was without guidance, for Rintala presented a question
of statutory construction never considered by the Minnesota Supreme
Court."
Rintala, its constructional and theoretical foundation, and its implications
for Minnesota litigants are extremely complex. An evaluation of the court's
reasoning and an analysis of the decision's effect upon the law of Minnesota
not only require that one bear in mind the goal of permitting the injured
resident to sue at home, but also necessitate a review of the brief but troubled
history of this type of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
II.

THE TENTATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION BY
ATTACHMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE OBLIGATIONS

Rintala is one of the few progeny of Seider v. Roth,3" the first decision to
hold, in an almost identical factual setting,33 that upon the happening of an
automobile accident, the liability insurer's contractual obligations to defend
and indemnify become subject to attachment as a basis for quasi in rem
jurisdiction. Seider is grounded in the New York Court of Appeals' classification of the insurer's obligations as a "debt" attachable under New York
26. Id. at 1053.
27. Id. at 1054-55.
28. Id.at 1053.
29. Id. at 1057.
30. Id.at 1053-56.
31. Id. at1047.
32. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), rehearing denied, 21 N.Y.2d
990, 238 N.E.2d 319,290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
33. The typical Seider-Rintala situation arises when a plaintiff with a cause of action arising
out of an out-of-state incident seeks to sue the non-resident defendant at home, rather than
traveling to the state where the cause of action arose or where defendant resides, by attaching the
obligations owed defendant by his insurer who does business in the state of plaintiffs residence.
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law:" and the absence of any contrary policy considerations.1
Seider relied heavily upon and affirmed an earlier court of appeals decision
that a liability insurance policy created a creditor-debtor relationship between
the insured and the insurance carrier even though no judgment had been
obtained against the non-resident insured or his estate. Borrowed by the
Seider court from its original context of a proceeding for the issuance of

ancillary letters of administration, that holding permitted the court to classify
the insurer's obligations to its insured as a debt for all purposes thus allowing
the direct application of New York statutes 37 permitting the attachment of
debts to the Seider situation.
Turning to the relevant public policy considerations, the court stated that it
saw no reasons which would militate against requiring the insurer and the
defendant to defend the action in New York .3 8 Neither did it state policy
reasons in favor of such a result, but instead relied upon precedent which
had found a similar result not repugnant to the public policy of the state of
New York.:" Denying that it created a right of "direct action" against a
liability insurer, the court noted that the insurer had contracted to defend
its insured wherever jurisdiction was properly obtained over him.4 0
From the very beginning, Seider spawned controversy.' The constitutionality of the procedure it established remained subject to doubt for several
years, and its rationale was analyzed and reanalyzed in a line of state and
34. 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
35. Id. at 114,216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
36. In re Riggle's Estate, II N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d436, 226 N.Y.S.2d416 (1962).
37. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 6202 (McKinney 1963) provides that any debt against which a
money judgment may be enforced is subject to attachment. New York law defines a "debt
against which a money judgment may be enforced" as follows:
A money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or is yet to
become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor, whether it was incurred
within or without the state, to or from a resident or non-resident, unless it is exempt
from application to the satisfaction of the judgment. A debt may consist of a cause of
action which could be assigned or transferred within or without the state. N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 5201(a) (McKinney 1963).
38. 17 N.Y.2d at 114,216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
39. Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965)
(permitting New York resident injured in a jurisdiction having a direct action statute to bring a
direct action against the insurer in New York).
40. The arguments raised in the dissent in Seider itself are typical. It stressed a single conceptual problem with the majority's analysis, the classification of liability insurance obligations
as a "debt." arguing that an attachable indebtedness must not depend upon a contingency but,
rather, that the debt must be absolutely owing either at present or in the future. The plaintiffs
were accused of indulging in circular reasoning to bootstrap themselves into jurisdiction. The
promise to defend was assumed to furnish jurisdiction for a civil suit that must be validly commenced before the obligation to defend could ever possibly accrue. The dissent distinguished
Riggle, which, because it dealt only with the appointment of an administrator, could, without
prejudicing the rights of any person, include promises within the definition of property even
though conditions precedent to their fulfillment were not yet due. 17 N.Y.2d at 115-18, 216
N.E.2d at 315-17, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103-05 (Burke, J., dissenting).
41. See commentary collected at note 84 infra.
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federal court decisions. A brief consideration of the travails of Seider jurisdiction in the New York courts is useful to an understanding of Rintala and
its implications.
At first, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of
the procedure it had established in the face of allegations that it denied the
defendant due process of law. In Simpson v. Loehmann4 2 the court concluded
that it should adhere to Seider and approved the policies which underlie
Seider jurisdiction.': Noting that the rigid historical limitations on personal
jurisdiction were giving way to a more realistic evaluation of the rights and
interests of the parties and the forum state, limited only by considerations
of fairness," it determined that the insurer's complete practical control of the
litigation 5' and the state's substantial and continuing interest in the controversy4" afforded sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 7 The court did, however,
42. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967). In Simpson, the defendant, a
Connecticut resident, appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to vacate the attachment of his liability insurance policy in New York, contending that the attachment violated his
right to due process of law, imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce, and impaired the
obligations owed under a contract. The decision focused on the first allegation and dispensed with
the two latter constitutional objections in a footnote. In dealing with the interstate commerce argument, the court noted that even though the defendant lacked standing to raise the issue, the
imposition of an attachment on a non-resident does not constitute an unconstitutional burden on
commerce. To the defendant's argument that the attachment impaired contract obligations by
inviting the insured to withhold cooperation in the defense of the action, the court responded that
the insurer had satisfactory recourse in such an event, for it could assert his lack of cooperation
as a defense to its duty to indemnify him for any resulting default judgment. Id. at 309 n.2, 234
N.E.2d at 670 n.2, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 635 n.2.
43. The court emphasized the state of New York's interest in providing a forum for its injured
citizens and argued that this interest combined with the nexus furnished by the insurance company's policy obligations empower the courts to exercise in rem jurisdiction over the defendant.
21 N.Y.2d at 310,234 N.E.2d at 671,287 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
44. Id.
45. The insurer selected the attorneys for the defendant, decided if and when to settle, and
made all procedural decisions in connection with the litigation. 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d
at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
46. Id.
47. Id. The 5-2 decision in Simpson to affirm Seider is less than a mandate for the Seider
procedure when one considers the make-up of the majority. Only two justices actually signed the
plurality opinion. Another concurred in that opinion. Another concurred in the result, favoring
it as a recognition of "realities," but viewing the decision, nevertheless, as an express sanction
of a direct action against the insurer, the real party in interest. Id.at 314, 234 N.E.2d at 674,
287 N.Y.S.2d at 640 (Keating, J., concurring). The five-member majority was completed by
two judges who concurred only to the extent that Simpson placed restrictions upon the use of the
Seider procedure, and argued that both the theoretical basis and practical consequences of the
Seider rule itself were vulnerable to attack. Id. at 314, 234 N.E.2d at 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 640
(Breitel & Bergan, JJ., concurring). The dissent saw no possible theory which could sustain the
constitutionality of the Seider procedure. Viewing the rule as "direct action," they found insufficient contacts with the state to support jurisdiction. The insurance contract obligations were not
viewed as "ordinary debts" falling within the rationale of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
On the contrary, the assignment of New York situs to the intangible obligations was seen as
being outside the "fairness" requirements of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
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limit the plaintiff's recovery to the limits of defendants' liability coverage,"
disavowing any intent to expand in personam jurisdiction."
During the following year, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York twice considered the constitutionality of the Seider
procedure."' It first held that Seider jurisdiction deprived the defendant of
due process of law' when viewed in conjunction with a New York statute
which forbid limited appearances by the defendant.52 Whether based on the
traditional theory that the obligation of the insurer constitutes an attachable
res or the modern functional theory that the insurer is the real party in interest,' :' the Seider procedure was held unconstitutional because of the
dilemma it creates for the insured. Appearance might constitute a consent to
the personal jurisdiction of the court, while non-appearance might constitute
54
a breach of the cooperation clause of the liability insurance policy.
The federal court's decision was extremely short-lived. Immediately following the decision, the defendant in Simpson moved for a rehearing. 5 In
denying that motion, the New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant
could proceed with a defense on the merits when Seider jurisdiction over him
had been obtained, without subjecting himself to an in personam judgment
in excess of the policy limits.56 Subsequently, the federal district court, con310 (1945), the majority's reliance on Riggle being deemed unjustified by the entirely different
facts of the two cases. Id. at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 642 (Burke & Scileppi, JJ.,
dissenting).
48. The court stated, without elaboration, that, for the purposes of the pending litigation, the
value of the asset attached, the liability insurance policy, was the policy's "face amount and not
some abstract or hypothetical value." Id. at 310,234 N.E.2d at 671,287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
49. In its opinion, the Simpson court explicitly stated that the decision in Seider concerned
itself only with the acquisition of quasi in rem jurisdiction by the attachment of the debt and that
neither its own decision nor that of the court in Seider purported to expand in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37. The court responded to the
argument that it had sanctioned a direct action against the insurer by repeating Seider's response
to the same argument. Id. at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 671-72, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
50. Jarvik v. Magic Mountain Corp., 290 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Both actions were commenced in state court and removed
to federal court by the defendants pursuant fo 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) and FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
An earlier attempt to procure a federal court adjudication of the constitutional issues raised
by the Seider procedure had failed. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vaage, 265 F. Supp. 556
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (three-judge panel) (panel dissolved on the theory that under 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1970) it lacked the power to enjoin the pending state court actions in the absence of a state court
adjudication of the constitutionality of the Seider procedure).
51. Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
52. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 320(b) (McKinney 1972).
53. 281 F. Supp. at 500.
54. Id. at 495-99.
55. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) (denying rehearing).
56. The court effectively amended N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 320(c) (McKinney 1972) to permit
a limited appearance by the defendant, stating: "[T]here may not be any recovery against the
defendant in this sort of case in an amount greater than the face value of such insurance policy
even though he proceeds with the defense on the merits." Id. at 991, 238 N.E.2d at 320, 290
N.Y.S.2d at 916 (emphasis added). In 1969, the Judicial Conference of New York amended
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sidering the issue for the second time that year, relied upon that decision to
uphold the constitutionality of the Seider procedure. 7
Any lingering doubts regarding the constitutionality of Seider jurisdiction",
were laid to rest by the exhaustive analysis of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Minichiello v. Rosenberg.5 1 Concluding that Seider had
authorized direct action by judicial decision,"' the court held that the Constitution would limit the application of the doctrine to cases in which the
forum state was either the place of the injury or the plaintiff's residence."
Though approving the New York court's construction of the state's statutes
to create a right to a limited appearance, 2 the federal court concluded that
due process also required that the defendant be further protected by denying
a Seider judgment a collateral estoppel effect in an in personam action in
3
another jurisdiction for an excess judgment.
Upon rehearing en banc, the second circuit adhered to its affirmance of
Seider, and, relying on Harris v. Balk, 64 rejected appellant's contention that
the procedure imposed an excessive and unconstitutional burden upon nonresidents.651 Pointing out that liability insurers would supply New York
counsel for the individual defendants, and noting that the procedure would
guarantee that liability insurance policies were applied to the purposes for
which they were purchased,66 the court argued that convenience transfers 7
§ 320(c) to permit limited appearance in all cases in which the sole basis of jurisdiction was the
attachment of the defendant's property.
57. Jarvik v. Magic Mountain Corp., 290 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
58. Actually, few such doubts should have lingered after the procedure was again upheld as
constitutional in Victor v. Lyon Associates, 21 N.Y.2d 695, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 424
(1967), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question sub nona. Hanover Ins. Co.
v. Victor, 393 U.S. 7, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 971 (1968).
59. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844, rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 949
(1969).
60. Id.at 109.
61. Id.at 110.
62. Id.at I11.
63. Whatever the right rule may be as to quasi in rem judgments generally, we think it
clear that neither New York nor any other state could constitutionally give collateral
estoppel effect to a Seider judgment when the whole theory behind this procedure is
that it is in effect a direct action against the insurer and that the latter rather than the
insured will conduct the defense. Id. at 112.
64. 198 U.S. 215(1905).
65. 410 F.2d at 117. The dissent in Minichiello agreed with the majority that Seider was in
effect a judicially created direct action statute and subjected the majority position to a rigorous
analysis based upon Watson v. Employees Liab. Ins. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), a United States
Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of Louisiana's direct action statute, and
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). After balancing considerations of
fairness to the parties, litigational convenience, and the interests of the state, the dissent concluded that a direct action purporting to provide a New York forum for all New York plaintiffs
regardless of other local contacts or considerations would violate due process. Id.at 113-17
(Anderson, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 118.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970) ("[F]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
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and the right of removal to the federal courts"' would protect defendants
against any potential hardships."
Since each of the New York cases relied upon the construction of one or
more state statutes,'" other states easily rejected Seider jurisdiction by construing their own statutes differently.7 Generally, the decisions distinguished
the New York line of cases by arguing that the local garnishment statute,
unlike that of New York, excluded from the purview of'a garnishable res the
72
insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify its insured.
7
With Turner v. Evers :' in 1973, a California intermediate appellate court
became the first outside of New York to accept Seider jurisdiction. The
combination of California's broad jurisdiction statute74 and the Minichiello
decision, permitted the Turner court to address itself immediately to the
question of the garnishability of insurance policy obligations. By broadly
interpreting 75 a California statute which included both debts and property
within the definition of a garnishable res,76 the court gave an affirmative
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district where it might have
been brought.")
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). Seider-Rintala actions are, by their very nature-resident
plaintiff and non-resident defendant-removable to federal court under the statutory provisions
for diversity jurisdiction. 410 F.2d at 118-19.
69. 410 F.2dat 119.
70. See statutes cited in note 37 supra.
71. Tessier v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 458 F.2d 1299 (lst Cir. 1972) ("debt" is contingent):
Kirchman v. Mikula, 443 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1971) (procedure rejected because Louisiana direct
action statute denied a similar result): Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vt. 1970) (liability
insurance obligations are contingent under Vermont law): Kirchman v. Mikula, 258 So. 2d 701
(La. App. 1972) (procedure rejected because direct action statute denies similar result); (State
es rel. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App. 1970) (liability
insurance obligations are contingent under Missouri statute); Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mut.
Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387 (Okla. 1972) (no amount was "owing absolutely and beyond contingency" as required by Oklahoma statute); De Rentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969)
(liability insurance obligations are not "property" within the meaning of the Rhode Island
statute): Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970) (South Carolina statute not as
comprehensive as New York statute): Housley v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390
(1967) (ignoring Seider though decided after it).
The Vermont statute at issue in Ricker is typical in requiring that anything owed the defendant
be due absolutely and without contingency to be garnishable. The court found that an insurance
company's liability under one of its policies was contingent and thus not subject to garnishment.
The Vermont court also found the dissent in Seider more persuasive than the majority opinion
on the point of"contingency." Ricker v. Lajoie, supra at 403.
72. See cases collected note 71 supra.
73. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. II, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (Super. Ct., App. Dep't 1973).
74. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ("A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.").
75. Turner cites an early California case for the proposition that "property" includes "every
species of estate, both real and personal, whether choate or inchoate" and includes all that is
one's own, whether corporeal or incorporeal. Ponsonby v. Suburban Fruit Lands Co., 210 Cal.
229, 232, 291 P. 167, 168 (1930), cited in Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. I1,20, 107
Cal. Rptr. 390, 396 (Super. Ct., App. Dep't 1973).
76. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 542, subd. 5 (West Supp. 1974).
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response. Relying on an earlier case which had based probate jurisdiction on
an insurance obligation, 7 it concluded that the insured's rights were
"property." 7 Moreover, the court determined that the insurer's obligation
was not contingent since the duty to defend and indemnify fell due upon the
filing of an action against the insured and thereafter was contingent only as
to amount.79 Finally, the court stressed the state's interest in protecting its
injured residents, noting a movement away from the jurisdictional bias favoring defendants and toward permitting the plaintiff to require the defendant
to come to him.""
Like the New York courts before it, the Turner court recognized the need
for limitations upon the right to exercise this sort of jurisdiction. It was careful to deny that it had expanded in personam jurisdiction or created a right of
direct action against the insurer."' To prevent harassment of non-resident
7
defendants, it authorized the use of a form of forum non conveniens.
Since the California Supreme Court has yet to pass upon the validity of
Seider jurisdiction, the procedure has won the approval of the highest state
court in only one state, New York. Most courts to consider it have rejected
it outright.113 Seider jurisdiction has received an equally cool reception from
the commentators, most of whom have criticized it severely. s4 Viewed in this
77. Keck v. Superior Court, 3 Civil 13521 (Super. Ct., Nov. 14, 1972).
78. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 20-21, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97.
79. Id. at 21-22, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 397-98.
80. Id. at 24, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
81. The defendant in Turner raised a "direct action defense," claiming that the procedure
permitted a direct action against the insurer, a result allegedly forbidden by California law. See
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580 (West 1972). The court answered this contention with three points: (1)
that since the action was against the insured and the insurer was only a garnisheee, no direct
action was involved: (2) that California law does not forbid direct actions, but rather, by placing
a heavier burden on insurers than on the insured's other obligees, makes available such an action:
and (3) that even if the provision of California law relied upon by defendant forbid direct actions,
another section of the law made the insurer garnishee directly liable to plaintiff. 31 Cal. App. 3d
at 22-24. 107 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99.
82. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 24-25, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 399-400. See CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE
§410.30 (West 1973).
83. Cases cited note 71 supra.
84. The most persistent and prolific critic is Professor David Siegel, who, since 1966, has written annual commentaries on Seider in the Practice Commentary to N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5201
(McKinney 1963). The other commentary has been almost unanimously unfavorable as well.
See Rosenberg, One ProceduralGenie Too Many or Putting Seider Back Into its Bottle, 71
Cot UM. L. RE-v. 660 (1971): Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1075 (1968): Note, Attachment of Automobile Liability Insurer's Obligations
to Defend and Indemnify-Seider v. Roth, 8 B.C. IND. & Cow. L. REV. 147 (1967); Comment,
Attachment of"Obligations--A New Chapter in Long Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. REV.
769 (1967): Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate
Corporation.67 Cot UM. L. REV. 550 (1967); Note, Seider v. Roth: Attachment of an Insurer's
Obligation to Defend, 71 DICK. L. REV. 653 (1967); Note, Minichiello v. Rosenberg: Garnish,nent of Intangibles-InSearch of a Rationale. 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 407 (1969); Note, Seider v.
Roth: The Constitutional Phase. 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 58 (1968): Comment, JurisdictionQuasi In Rent: Seider v.Roth to Turner v. Evers- Wrong Means to the Right End, II SAN
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context, the result in Rintala was surprising. Some have seen the decision as
an indication that the doctrine enunciated in Seider remains viable and that
attitudes toward it may be changing. 5 Whether the Minnesota Supreme
Court will interpret Minnesota law as the federal court predicted it would"6
remains to be seen. Nevertheless, Rintala presents an interesting illustration
of the tension between technical jurisdictional issues and practical insurance
problems, a tension that has given rise to both Seider jurisdiction and the
controversy surrounding it.
III. SEIDER-TYPE JURISDICTION COMES TO MINNESOTAAN ANALYSIS OF RINTALA V. SHOEMAKER

Like Seider and Turner before it, Rintala is grounded in the construction
of a garnishment statute."7 In Minnesota pre-judgment garnishment was for
many years"' available at any time during the pendency of the main action,
without regard to its purpose or the circumstances which prompted its use. 89
In 1969, however, the garnishment statute was amended to limit the availability of pre-judgment garnishment. 0 As a result, pre-judgment garnishment
is now available only in two circumstances: first, where it is necessary to
acquire quasi in rem jurisdiction, and second, where the garnishee and defendant are parties to a contract of suretyship, guarantee, or insurance whereby
the garnishee may be held to respond to another person's claim against the
defendant."
DIEGO L. REV. 504 (1974); Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19
STAN. L. REV. 654 (1967): Comment, Seider v. Roth in the Wild and Woolly West, 5 Sw. U. L.
RE:V. 417 (1973).

Two articles, one being one of the earliest and the other one of the most recent, are relatively
favorable. See Comment, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Obtained by Attaching Obligations Under
an Automobile Liability Policy, 51 MINN. L. REv. 158 (1966); Note, Attachment of Liability
Insurance Policies: What Remains of the Seider Doctrine After Seven Years of Conflict, 34
Oo ST. L.J. 818 (1973).
85. See Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies: What Remains of the Seider
Doctrine After Seven Years of Conflict, supra note 84, at 849-52.
86. 362 F. Supp. at 1052-53.
87. Garnishment is a purely statutory remedy. Gustafson v. Johnson, 235 Minn. 358, 373,
51 N.W.2d 108, 116(1952) (dictum).
88. For a history of garnishment including specific references to early Minnesota law, see
Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1942).
89. Minn. Laws 1945 ch.424,§ I (1945).
In any action in a court of record or justice court for the recovery of money, at the time
of issuing the summons or at any time during the pendency of the action or after judgment therein against the defendant, a garnishee summons may be issued against any
third person .... Any individual, partnership or corporation within the state having
property subject to garnishment may be named as garnishee. Id.
90. Minn. Laws 1969 ch. 1142,§ 1.
91. MINN. STAT.§571.41, subd. 2(1971).
Garnishment shall be permitted before judgment in the following instances only:
(I) For the purpose of establishing quasi in rem jurisdiction . . . (c) [when] the defendant
is a nonresident individual .... (2) When the garnishee and the debtor are parties to a
contract of suretyship, guarantee, or insurance, because of which the garnishee may be
held to respond to any person for the claim asserted against the debtor in the main
action. Id. (emphasis added).
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Both tangible and intangible personal property are subject to garnishment
in Minnesota, but intangibles in the nature of obligations owed by one
person to another, such as debts, are subject to the further statutory limitation that they be "due absolutely, and without depending on any contingency."52 The judicial decisions make clear that the existence of the obligation
itself, not the extent of the obligation or the timing of its performance, is the
contingency of which the statute speaks.9 3 When disallowing an attempted
garnishment because of this statutory prohibition, the courts have consistently relied upon the lack of a judgment or other facts creating a certainty
that the obligation would at some time fall due."
The situs of intangibles for the purpose of obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction over their owner is determined in accordance with the principles of
Harris v. Balk." Debts and other obligations cling to the obligor and may
be garnished wherever he can be found within the physical boundaries of the
forum state.9
The Rintala court's ruling that the garnishment encompassed liability insurance obligations was based upon the 1969 amendment to that statute and
upon the Minnesota Supreme Court's oft-stated interest in providing Minnesota residents a local forum in which to sue non-residents.97 The two rationales
are closely intertwined.
While recognizing the general rule that contingent obligations are not
subject to garnishment, 9 the court declined to hold, 99 as the Seider court
had,"" that the duties an automobile liability insurer owes to its insured are
not contingent but rather are absolutely owed after the happening of an
accident. Instead, the court held, based on its interpretation of the 1969
amendment, that the Minnesota statutory authority for pre-judgment garnishment included these insurance contract obligations without regard to
whether they were contingent. 9 '
92. MINN. STAT. § 571.43 (1971) ("No person or corporation shall be adjudged a garnishee by
reason of: (I) Any money or other thing due to the judgment debtor, unless at the time of the
service of the summons the same is due absolutely, and without depending on any contingency
) (emphasis
..... added).
93. S.T. McKnight Co. v. Tomkinson, 209 Minn. 399, 296 N.W. 569 (1941); Knudson v.
Anderson. 199 Minn. 479, 272 N.W. 376 (1937).
94. See Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Delta Studios, Inc., 289 Minn. 202, 184 N.W.2d 3 (1971)

(unliquidated contract claim is contingent and not garnishable); Northwestern Nat'l Bank v.
Hilton & Associates, 271 Minn. 564, 136 N.W.2d 646 (1965) (unliquidated tort claim is contingent and not garnishable); Smaltz Goodwin Co. v. Poppe, Inc., 172 Minn. 43, 214 N.W. 762

(1927) (claim under a fire insurance policy without sworn proof of loss is contingent and not
garnishable).
95. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
96. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Templeton v. Van Dyke, 169 Minn. 188, 210 N.W.
874 (1926): Harvey v.Great N. Ry., 50 Minn. 405, 52 N.W.905 (1892).
97. 362 F.Supp.at 1050.
98. Id. at 1049.
99. Id. at 1049-50.
100. 17N.Y.2dat l13, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
101. 362 F. Supp. at 1050-51.
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The court gleaned a legislative intent to change the rule regarding garnishment of insurance policy obligations from several facts. First, the amendment authorizing pre-judgment garnishment where the debtor and garnishee
are parties to an insurance contract was more specific and more recently
enacted than the provisions of the statute forbidding the garnishment of
contingent obligations. 02 Second, the amendment was adopted after the
Seider decision, giving rise to the inference that the legislature had intended
to authorize Seider procedure.'0 3 Third, the provisions forbidding garnishment of contingent obligations, since they were phrased so as to apply to
"judgment debtors," could be interpreted to have post-judgment application
04
only.
The court found additional support for its holding in the Minnesota
Supreme Court's expansive notions of personal jurisdiction which apparently
05
derive from its desire to provide the state's residents with a local forum.'
The Minnesota court has reasoned that the state's interest in affording maximum protection to residents injured by acts of non-residents requires the
extension of the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the courts to the maximum
limits consistent with constitutional limitations.'0 Conversely, the Minnesota court has refused to permit a non-resident plaintiff to establish jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, though admitting that it would have
granted succor to a resident plaintiff on the same facts.0 7
The Rintala court's unusual rationale, particularly its dependence upon
legislative intent, was designed to avoid some of the conceptual and technical
difficulties for which the Seider decision has been so severely criticized. 09 The
court has been complimented for accomplishing that objective.0 9 If its
rationale is valid, the decision may give Seider jurisdiction a new respectability, especially in those states having garnishment statutes similar to
Minnesota's. Thus, the basis of the court's decision is deserving of detailed
scrutiny.
The Rintala court particularly wished to avoid" the circular reasoning,"
102. Id. at 1052.
103. Id. at 1050.
104. Id. at 1051-52.
105. Id. at 1052.
106. See B & J Mfg. Co. v. Solar Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1973) (applying MinneMinn. -,
216 N.W.2d 140 (1974);
sota law); State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, Minn. -, 210 N.W.2d 227 (1973); MidFranklin Mfg. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., _
Continent Freight Lines, Inc., v. Highway Trailer Indus., Inc., 291 Minn. 251, 190 N.W.2d 670
(1971); Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 284 Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292 (1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1010(1970).
107. Mid-Continent Freight Lines, Inc. v. Highway Trailer Indus., Inc., 291 Minn. 251, 190
N.W.2d 670 (1971).
108. 362 F. Supp. at 1050-51.
109. Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies: What Remains of the Seider Doctrine
After Seven Years of Conflict, supra note 84, at 849.
110. 362 F. Supp. at 1050-51.
I 11. I.e., the duty to defend and indemnify which forms the basis for jurisdiction cannot fall
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and nice questions of statutory interpretation"' involved in the construction
of such phrases as "contingent obligation," "property," and "debt." In Cali:
fornia, the insurer's obligations are "property," extant and garnishable;"'1
'4
in New York, they constitute "debt.""
Nevertheless, the 'garnishment
statutes of these two states are not noticeably different from those of the
states which have held that such obligations are not property or not debts
or that, as contingent obligations, they are simply not garnishable." 5 All of
the courts which had previously considered Seider jurisdiction had become
embroiled in these semantic problems, which defied consistent analysis and
which, after all, had little to do with the merits of quasi in rem jurisdiction." 6
The Rintala approach avoids another problem, the valuation of the obligation." 7 The Seider court has been severely criticized for basing jurisdiction
upon an obligation, the duty of the insurer to defend its insured, which would
be exhausted during the course of the litigation." 8 The Rintala interpretation
of the statute renders such a criticism irrelevant. 11
The rationale employed by the Rintala court avoids many of the pitfalls
which have subjected Seider and its progeny to criticism. Nevertheless, its
underpinning-the construction of the 1969 amendment to authorize prejudgment garnishment of insurance obligations, without regard to whether
they are contingent-is not free of doubt.
First, the amendment was intended to restrict, not expand, the availability
of pre-judgment garnishment. 2 0 Prior to the amendment, a garnishee summons could be issued at any time during the pendency of an action.' 2' After
the amendment, the summons may be issued at any time after default or
judgment, but pre-judgment garnishment is limited, for our purposes, to
cases of quasi in rem jurisdiction and cases where the garnishee and the
due until the commencement of a lawsuit which, of course, requires the existence of jurisdiction.
See note 40 supra.
112. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 314, 234 N.E.2d 669, 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d
633, 640 (1967) (concurring opinion) ("it is the most tenuous of nominalist thinking that accords
the status of an asset, leviable and attachable, to a contingent liability to defend and indemnify
under a public liability insurance policy.")
113. Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. II, 20, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390, 396-97 (Super. Ct.,
App. Dep't 1973).
114. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 114,216 N.E.2d 312,315,269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102(1966).
115. Compare, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §§ 542, subd. 5,544 (West Supp. 1974) with S.C.
CODE ANN. §§10-901 to -923 (Supp. 1973).
116. See cases cited note 71 supra.
117. 362 F. Supp. at 1051.
118. See, e.g., Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation. supra note 84, at 552. Cf Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 461, 176 S.E.2d
127. 130(1970).
119. If the statute expressly authorizes the garnishment, it is unnecessary to determine
whether the duty to defend is a part of the res. 362 F. Supp. at 1051.
120. Nielsen, Stock & Blackburn, Ltd. v. Financial Acceptance Corp., - Minn. -, 216
N.W.2d 693 (1974) (dictum).
121. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
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debtor are parties to a contract of insurance."' 2 Arguably, then, the amendment should not be construed to expand pre-judgment garnishment beyond
the limitations in effect prior to the amendment. Those limits included a
prohibition upon the garnishment of contingent insurance obligations. ' :
Second, the Rintala court reasoned that because the 1969 amendment was
enacted 3 years after Seider was decided and specifically mentioned insurance contracts, the legislative intent was to provide for the Seider procedure. "' This conclusion seems to ignore the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the amendment. The amendment's temporal coincidence with
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.25 indicates that the legislative action may
have been prompted by the legal environment which gave rise to Sniadach
rather than that from which Seider developed. 26 The Sniadach decision was
announced and the amendment signed into law the same day." 7 Though the
coincidence does not necessarily prove that one event caused the other, it
seems safe to conclude that limitation of pre-judgment garnishment was an
idea whose time had come. Sniadach is cited as causing the downfall of
several statutes, including the Minnesota garnishment statute. 2 Under the
circumstances, the view that the amendment was intended to assure that
Minnesota' pre-judgment garnishment procedure complied with due process
is equally as plausible as the Rintala court's explanation.
Third, the court's conclusion that the provisions of the Minnesota statute
which prohibit the garnishment of contingent obligations exclude prejudgment garnishment from their purview is vulnerable to criticism. The
court's analysis ignores the fact that the term "judgment debtor," which it
takes to be language of limitation, 9 is defined for the purposes of prejudgment garnishment to include potential judgment debtors.2 " The definition
was added as a part of the 1969 amendment'' and can easily be construed
to permit the application of the contingent-obligation prohibition to prejudgment fact situations.
Fourth, the canons of statutory construction adopted in Minnesota' 32 would
appear to require that effect be given both to the provision of the garnish122. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
123. Smaltz Goodwin Co. v. Poppe, Inc., 172 Minn. 43, 214 N.W. 762 (1927) SwedishAmerican Nat'l Bank v. Bleecker, 72 Minn. 383, 75 N.W. 740 (1898) (senible):Gies v. Bechtner
& Kottman, 12 Minn. 279 (Gil. 183) (1867).
124. 362 F. Supp. at 1050-51.

125. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
126. See, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Law: Garnishment Without Notice and Hearing Is
Denial of Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 853 (1970).
127. That day was June 9, 1969. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
Minn. Laws 1969 ch. 1142, § I. For a discussion of the temporal coincidence see Credit Serv.
Co. v. Linnerooth, 290 Minn. 256,257, 187 N.W.2d 632, 633 (1971).
128. Lebowitzv. Forbes Leasing& Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
129. 362 F. Supp. at 1051-52.
130. MINN. STAT.§571.41,subd. 3(1971).
131. Minn. Laws 1969 ch. 1142,§ I(1969).
132. MINN. STAT. ch. 645 (1971).
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ment statute requiring that garnishable obligations be due absolutely and
the one permitting the pre-judgment garnishment of an insurer. The court, it
seems, interpreted the latter as an exception to the former, on the theory that
one of the provisions would necessarily govern the other.'33 Proceeding
directly to apply the canons of construction to determine which section was
to control,' 14 the court ignored the rule which requires that seemingly inconsistent statutory provisions are to be construed, if at all possible, so as to
13 5
reconcile them and give effect to both.
In this case both provisions of the garnishment statute could be given
effect. The Legislature might have intended the insurance provisions to apply
to the classic case where the funds which provide the only source of protection for the garnishor are likely to be dissipated prior to the rendition of judgment in the main action. While the due process considerations underlying
Sniadach may forbid wholesale pre-judgment garnishment of the debtor's
personal property to prevent its dissipation,'136 insurance policy proceeds,
particularly proceeds which the insurer is obligated to pay over to the plaintiff
in the main action, are arguably an exception to the Sniadach rule. Prejudgment garnishment of those proceeds, unlike garnishment of other types
of assets, will seldom deprive the defendant of valuable property that he
could apply to his own use during the pendency of the main action.'37 Since
the policy reasons which led to the decision in Sniadach are generally not
present in cases where an obligation arising under an insurance policy is
owed, the Legislature may well have intended to retain traditional prejudgment garnishment in these situations.
Given this interpretation, the insurance section may be reconciled with
the contingency provision. The two may be read together to permit garnishment only after the loss foreseen by the insurance policy has occurred, causing the proceeds to become absolutely due and owing, but the resolution of a
collateral issue requires litigation causing the garnishor to seek protection
against the possible dissipation of the proceeds. 38 When read to contemplate
133. "Although this statute [contingency section] is still in force it is clearly superseded by
Minn. Stat. § 571.41, subd, 2 [19711] .... " 362 F. Supp. at 1051.
134. Id.at 1051-52.
135. MINN. STAT. §§ 645.16,.17(2) (1971).
136. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
137. Practical rather than legal reasons compel this conclusion..First, since the proceeds of a
first party casualty policy are generally limited to net loss, they will as a practical matter be consumed by the insured's bills and will be unavailable to be spent for other purposes. See G. Coucii,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §

1.9 (2d ed. 1959). Second, the drafting of the statute contem-

plates that the garnishor will have a direct interest in the proceeds of the policy. See MINN. STAT.
§ 571.41, subd. 2 (1971). Thus, the action is likely to involve proceeds to which the insured
himself is not entitled, either because third party coverage is involved, as the result of assignment
of benefits, or for some other reason.
138. Such situations may frequently arise under health and accident policies. Where the illness or injury, and thus liability itself, is admitted, litigation between the insured and the third
party may still be necessary. For example, disputes over the need for or cost of medical products
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these situations, the section authorizing pre-judgment garnishment need not
supersede the contingency provision.
Fifth, some significance may be attributed to the Legislature's failure to
amend the garnishment statute to provide explicitly for the Seider procedure.
The 1969 amendment was not limited to the pre-judgment garnishment
sections of the statute but included the contingency provisions as well.' 9
Thus, it would have been a simple matter for the Legislature to repeal the
prohibition on garnishment of contingent obligations or, alternatively, to
except Seider situations from its operation by explicit language. It seems
fair to draw a negative inference from the Legislature's failure to take advantage of this opportunity. 40
Finally, the garnishment statute lists the existence of a contract of insurance between debtor and garnishee and the establishment of quasi in rem
jurisdiction as alternative grounds for pre-judgment garnishment. "' Had the
Legislature intended by the insurance amendment to permit Seiderjurisdiction, it seems that it would have stated the two grounds in the conjunctive to
clarify its intent. The insurance amendment could have been drafted as a subclass of the provision permitting garnishment for the purposes of acquiring
quasi in rem jurisdiction. The alternative language suggests that the Legislature had something other than Seider jurisdiction in mind when it enacted
the amendment.4 2
Taken in the aggregate, the doubts outlined above raise serious question as
to the soundness of basing Seider jurisdiction on Minnesota's amended garnishment statute. It would seem that the Rintala court avoided the conceptual
and constructional problems other courts have found with Seiderjurisdiction
only to encounter some different difficulties of equal magnitude.
The Rintala court's approach to the constitutional and procedural issues
involved in this sort of quasi in rem jurisdiction suffers from similar weaknesses. Relying heavily on the New York courts' analyses of these matters,
the court left many pertinent questions unanswered.
The court held that the jurisdiction it authorized complied with due
process for two reasons. First, as a mechanical matter, the garnishee was
and services may arise between the supplier of those products and services and the insured. In

such a case the supplier, entitled to the policy proceeds by reason of an assignment of benefits or
through subrogation, may wish to garnish the insurance proceeds during the pendency of his
action against the insured, particularly where other suppliers are competing for the funds.
Analogous problems arise with liability insurance. Even where liability is Odmitted it may be
necessary to proceed to trial to determine the amount of damages. The resultant delay can prove
extremely prejudicial to a claimant if the policy in question contains per-incident coverage limit
and the claims of the several claimants exceed that limit. As the multiple claimants, some of
whom may already have procured judgments or settlement agreements, may seek to deplete the
fund, the claimant litigating the extent of his damages will wish to garnish the funds to prevent

the other claimants from taking more than their pro rata share.
139. Minn. Laws 1969 ch. 1142,§3.
140. Cf MINN. STAT. ,645.16,
141. Id. § 57141,subd. 2.
142. Id. §645,08(l).

.31, subd. 1 (1971).
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subject to personal jurisdiction of the Minnesota courts.'4 3 Second, the fundamental nature of the overall process, when analyzed, afforded "fairness"
to all parties. 4'
The first basis for the finding of constitutionality was a simple one. When
quasi in rem jurisdiction is sought by means of garnishment, the garnishee
must, of course, be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court in which
the action is commenced.' 45 Well-settled principles of due process require that
a party have certain "minimum contacts" with the state so that "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" are not offended by the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over him."' The Rintala court found that the garnishee's transaction of a substantial amount of business in the state and its
registration, pursuant to state statute,"' with the Commissioner of Insurance,
appointing him its agent for service of process, met the minimum contacts
requirement."'
Determining whether the Seider procedure afforded the fairness required
by due process was a more complex issue. The court concluded that the standard could be met only if certain limitations were placed upon the exercise of
this type of quasi in rem jurisdiction."19 First, it required that the defendantinsured be given a notice sufficient to afford him an opportunity to come to
the state and defend the action.'50 Second, the defendant must have the right
to make a limited appearance and defend the action on the merits without exposing himself to in personam judgments in excess of his insurance policy
limits.'' Finally, the right to invoke jurisdiction in this manner must be
limited to residents of the forum to avoid unduly burdening the insured and
his insurer .152
The notice requirement is consistent with long-standing requirements of
due process,'' and was clearly satisfied by the procedure used by the garnishor
in Rintala, personal service of a summons and complaint and garnishee summons upon the defendant.' 54 The limited appearance requirement and the
limitation to resident plantiffs are peculiar to Seider jurisdiction and were
143. 362 F. Supp. at 1054.
144. Id.at 1056.
145. See note 13 supra.
146. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958) (requiring that defendant have purposefully availed himself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the state, invoking the benefit -and protection of its laws): McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (upholding state's jurisdiction over defendant
because the contract involved had a "substantial connection" with the forum state). See also
Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965).
147. MINN. STAT.§60A.19(1971).
148. 362 F. Supp. at 1054.
149. Id.at 1054-56.
150. Id.at 1054.
151. Id.at 1054-55.
152. Id.at 1055-56.
153. See, e.g.,
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
154. 362 F. Supp. at 1054.
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borrowed from the decisions of the New York state and federal courts.
It was the non-availability of a limited appearance which had caused the
Seider procedure to be held unconstitutional by a federal court in New York,
and it was the existence of a right to a limited appearance which caused the55
subsequent approval of the procedure by the federal courts in New York.
The Minnesota court noted this sequence of events and similarly held that
the absence of a limited appearance would place the defendant in an unconscionable dilemma.' 6 Appearance would constitute submission to personal
jurisdiction and expose him to an in personam judgment for sums in excess of
the policy limits. " The defendant's non-appearance would result in a default
judgment, since the insurer's opportunity to defend would be precluded by the
defendant's failure to appear.' The net result would be to grant plaintiff in
personam jurisdiction over the defendant, a result which would offend due
9
process.15
Unlike the New York courts, however, the Rintala court did not conclude
that the absence of a right to a limited appearance rendered the procedure unconstitutional. Instead of waiting for the Minnesota Supreme Court to determine whether the rule prohibiting such appearances6 0 applied to Seider-type
actions or certifying the question to the Minnesota court for immediate resolution,' the federal court proceeded immediately to resolve the tension
between the respective rights and liabilities of the insurer and the insured in
these actions. With something of a leap of faith, it predicted that the Minnesota court would interpret Minnesota's appearance rules2to permit a defense
1
on the merits without exposure beyond the policy limits.
Limiting the availability of the procedure to actions brought by resident
plaintiffs was similarly borrowed from the New York federal courts. 63
Reasoning that unlimited access to Seider jurisdiction would unduly burden
garnishees who, like the insurer in Rintala, did business in all 50 states,' and
lead to blatant forum shopping,6 5 the court followed Minichiello in limiting
61
the action to resident plaintiffs.
155. See notes 50 to 69 supra and accompanying text.
156. 362 F. Supp. at 1054-55.
157. Id.
158. The liability insurer has not only'a duty but also a correlative right to defend the plaintiffs action. Defendant's non-appearance, in violation of the cooperation clause which is stanard in liability insurance policies, will thus relieve the insurer of the duty to indemnify, exposing
the insured to full liability. Id.
159. Id. at 1055.
160. MINN. R. Civ. P. 4.04.
161. MINN. STAT. § 605.09(i) (1971).
162. 362 F. Supp. at 1055.
163. See notes 60 to 61 supra and accompanying text. See also Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation,
Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969); Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1968).
164. 362 F. Supp. at 1056.
165. In Rintala itself, plaintiffs were residents of Minnesota and the court noted that there was
nothing to indicate the presence of forum shopping in the case. Id.
166. Id.
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Arguing that Seider jurisdiction was clearly constitutional when so limited," 7 the court praised the fairness of the procedure.' The court failed,
however, to advance the analysis of the New York and California courts and
ignored the procedural, constitutional, and logical problems which are coming
to light as the courts gain more experience with Seider cases' A number of
these issues are particularly complex and all render Seider procedure difficult
to use in practice.
The destruction of the principle of avoiding multiple litigation gives rise to
a number of the most difficult problems. Ordinarily, if the defendant in a
quasi in rem action appears and defends on the merits, the matter is litigated
to a complete judgment. 7 In order to conform Seider jurisdiction to the
requirements of due process, however, that salutary procedure has been
eliminated. Though the trier of fact will not be bound to limit its damage verdict to the policy limits, the plaintiff will be required to relitigate the question
of damages in another forum to recover the excess. To give the Seiderjudgment a res judicata effect as to the issue of damages in an in personam action
in another jurisdiction would be equivalent to disallowing a limited appearance in the Seider action and would presumably be constitutionally objec7
tionable for the same reasons.' '

Whether a Seider judgment will be res judicata as to other issues, such as
liability, is subject to serious doubt. 172 The plaintiff may be required to relitigate the entire action in the second forum. Similarly, it remains unclear
whether the defendant may raise the Seider judgment as res judicata in the
second action if he wins in the first or if the verdict is less than the policy
limits.
Choice-of-law problems which always abound in automobile accident cases
167. Id. at 1056-57.
168. Id. The court also briefly considered another constitutional issue-whether Seiderjurisdiction, if accepted in many states, might become an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. While not eliminating consideration of the issue should it be raised in a later case, the
court concluded that there had been no showing that an undue burden existed or would ever
occur. It noted that the insurer in this case was simply exposed to an action in one more jurisdiction than it would otherwise would be, which was not an intolerable burden. Id.at 1056. See
International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934). In connection with the
interstate commerce argument, the court also rejected the garnishee's contention that its valid
expectations had been ignored. The court noted that the Seider procedure had been accepted in
New York 5 years previously and that the insurer had issued the policy in question after Seider
was decided so that it could not argue that it had no expectation that this type of action might
be permitted in additional states. See Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d
502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956).
169. These are compiled and set out in some detail in Siegel, Attaching Insurer's Obligation to Defend and Indemnify,. Supplementary Practice Commentary, N.Y. Cir. PRAc. LAW
§ 5201 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
170. See, e.g. id. at 35.
171. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 111-112 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
844, rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 949 (1969).
172. Seeid.
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with multi-state contacts, are exacerbated by the adoption of Seiderjurisdiction . 7: Where the substantive tort law of the states having contacts with the
incident differs it is unsettled whether the Seider forum has a sufficient
interest in the action to apply its own law. Moreover, if an in personam action
for an excess judgment is brought in a case with multi-state contacts there is
the possibility that different rules of substantive law will be applied in the two
actions because of the different choice-of-law rules followed by the two forum
states.
Rintala's limitation of the action to resident plaintiffs fails to contemplate
the possibility of an action brought by multiple plaintiffs, some residents and
some non-residents. 74 Whether the resident plaintiffs should be entitled to
preference over the non-residents, whether all plaintiffs should enjoy the
advantages normally accorded to residents only, or whether the entire action
should be dismissed is open to debate.
The details of the limited appearance which the Rintala court felt certain
that the Minnesota Supreme Court would authorize remain vague. There is
the possibility that any affirmative action by a defendant making a limited
appearance, such as filing a counterclaim or engaging in pretrial discovery,
will convert the limited appearance into a general one. 17' Defendant and his
counsel, who is likely to be the insurer's counsel as well, will have no model
for the mechanics of the limited appearance, and the trial courts of the state
will be similarly without guidance.
The Riniala court also failed to state against whom the resultant judgment
will run. Arguably, it should not be against the insured, since he is liable only
to the extent of his insurance coverage. But it would hardly seem that it can
17
run against the insurer who is not even a party to the suit.
Finally, it is not even clear whether the Rintala procedure will apply in tort
cases arising other than out of automobile accidents, and if so, whether it will
77
apply to cases which sound other than in tort.
Though this listing of problems and issues is far from exhaustive, '7 it raises
doubts regarding the practicality of the Seider procedure. When considered
together with the shaky conceptual and constructional base upon which the
Rintala court grounded the procedure, the wisdom of importing Seiderjurisdiction to Minnesota seems questionable.
IV.

CONCLUSION-TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL RESOLUTION OF TIE
PROBLEM-RINTALA AND DIRECT ACTION

The issues raised by and giving rise to decisions such as Seider and Rintala
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
note 84

Siegel, supra note 169, at 30-31.
See id. at 28-29.
Id. at 24,40-42.
Id. at 37-39.
See. e.g., id., at 50-5 I.
Additional examples may be found in Siegel. supra note 169. and authorities collected
supra.
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are certainly not clean, logical questions of law. As in many diversions of a
main stream of the law, social policies are basic, if not explicit, determinants
of judicial opinion. Arguably, the old policy of forcing the plaintiff to travel
to the defendant's domicile to bring an action contemplates only "typical"
litigations involving individual plaintiffs suing individual defendants of
similar resources. Where an individual plaintiff sues a defendant whose insurer will bear total defense responsibility, the old doctrine may be unrealistic.
In view of the disparity of resources and of the insurance company's capability and readiness to defend anywhere it does business, arguments that permitting a plaintiff to sue at home will unduly burden the defendant seem to
fly in the face of both economic reality and social policy.
Rintala is not to be criticized for recognizing these realities, but rather for
recognizing them incompletely and for attempting to solve modern social
problems with last century's legal techniques. Many of the conceptual, constitutional, and practical problems imported to Minnesota along with Seider
jurisdiction are a direct result of the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction to
achieve the desired result. 179
That criticism is generally accompanied by a suggestion that since Seider
jurisdiction is functionally a direct action against the insurer, the quasi in rem
fiction should be discarded in favor of open acceptance of direct action.8 0
This suggestion, however, suffers from the same failing as does the adoption
of Seider jurisdiction. Neither is designed to meet the precise problem sought
to be solved and both produce undesirable side effects.
Direct action, particularly when accomplished by judicial decision, rather
than by statute,' brings its own procedural and technical difficulties which
may be as knotty as those accompanying Seider jurisdiction. 82 Further, most
direct action statutes presently in effect are over-inclusive and under-inclusive
when adapted to the Seider-type of problem. Most do not permit direct action
when the tort occurred outside of the enacting state,' 3 making them seriously
under-inclusive. The fact that most permit the direct action when the tortfeasor is a resident 84 and when the plaintiff is a non-resident'8 5 makes them
over-inclusive as well.
Perhaps what is needed is a direct action statute modeled after that of
179. See Siegel, supra note 169, at 52: "The in rem trappings do not help one whit, and hurt
intensely. They take endless quantities of judicial time, to say nothing of that of the lawyers,
without adding one jot of benefit to justify the effort."
180. See, e.g., Comment, Seider v. Roth to Turner v. Evers- Wrong Means to the Right End,
supra note 84.
181. See. e.g.. Comment, Civil Procedure: Judicial Creation of Direct Action Against Automobile Liability Insurers, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 145 (1969).
182. See, e.g., Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problenis, supra note 15.
183. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (Supp. 1974): R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 27-7-2 Supp.
1973): WIs. STAT. § 260.11 (1973).
184. See statutes collected supra note 12.
185. See statutes collected supra note 12.
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Rhode Island which permits direct action only when the plaintiff cannot
obtain personal jurisdiction over the tortfeasor18 6 Perhaps not. While a
statute could be drafted to permit direct action only when a resident plaintiff
cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant or cannot
do so in a reasonably convenient forum, further study might show such a
statute to be cumbersome and unworkable.
The point is that the advocates of direct action statutes as a solution to
the whole matter have placed the emphasis on the wrong word. What is
needed is not a direct action statute or a quasi in rem statute, but simply a
statute, grounded in a thorough legislative study of the matter, and precisely
tailored to deal with the Seider situation and no other. It must be drafted
to meet the particular problem: the inability of some plaintiffs in a mobile
society to obtain personal jurisdiction over tortfeasors or to do so without
exhorbitant expense. It must take into account the particular commercial
fact that may solve plaintiff's plight: the defendant's coverage by an insurance
company doing business in plaintiff's home state. It must state precisely who
may sue whom, under what circumstances an action may be brought, how
the action is to be prosecuted, and the consequences that will flow from the
litigation.
A statute of that sort, breaking free from the traditional legal concepts,
unfettered by the old labels, could confront the real social and economic
issues that led to Seider in the first instance. Even more than the direct
action statute such a statute would take cognizance of the fact that liability
insurance is here to stay, that its effects have extreme economic significance,
and that lawmakers must begin to delineate its role if the law is to remain
responsive to the litigants' real needs.
186. R.I.

GEN. LAWS ANN.

§27-7-1 (1969).
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